T. Ryan Byerly

Peer-reviewed Articles

Philosophy of Religion

“Do God’s Beliefs about the Future Depend on the Future?” Journal of Analytic Theology (forthcoming).

“Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability,” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 75, no.2 (2014): 137-54.

“God Knows the Future by Ordering the Times,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 5

“Why Infallible Divine Foreknowledge cannot Uniquely Threaten Human Freedom, but its Mechanics
Might,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4, no.4 (Dec 2012).

“Explaining Away the Prevention Argument for Geachianism,” Ars Disputandi, Vol 12 (2012).

“Why Persons cannot be Properties,” Philosophy and Theology 24, no.1 (2012): 67-83.

“Ockhamism vs Molinism, Round Two: A Reply to Warfield,” Religious Studies 47,4 (2011): 503-11.

“Intentions, Intentionally Permitting, and the Problem of Evil,” Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association 85 (2011): 223-36.

“The Ontomystical Argument, Revisited,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2010):

Epistemology and Metaphysics

“Reconstituting Ersatzer Presentism,” with Dan Padgett, Res Philosophica 91, 3 (2014): 491-502.

“Explanationism and Justified Beliefs about the Future,” Erkenntnis 78, no.1 (2013): 229-43.

  • Discussed in Kevin McCain, “Evidentialism, Explanationism, and Beliefs about the Future,” Erkenntnis 79, no.1 (2014): 99-109.

“The Evidential Support Relation in Epistemology,” Oxford Bibliographies Online, Philosophy Section,
ed. Duncan Pritchard, published (12-19-2012).

“It Seems Like There Aren’t Any Seemings,” Philosophia 40, no.4 (2012): 771-782.

  • Discussed in Preston Werner, “Seemings: Still Dispositions to Believe,” Synthese 191, no.8 (2014): 1761-1774.

“Eliminativism and Reference,” Southwest Philosophical Studies (2010).

Virtue Ethics

“The Values and Varieties of Humility,” Philosophia 42, 4 (2014): 889-910.

  • Discussed in Jorge Garcia, “Methods and Finding in the Study of Virtues: Humility,” Philosophia

“The Special Value of Epistemic Self-Reliance,” Ratio 26, 2 (2013).

“Wisdom and Appropriate Risk-Taking,” Philosophy and Theology 25, no.1 (2013): 109-127.

“Faith as an Epistemic Disposition,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4, no.1 (2012): 109-28.