On Telling and Trusting

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A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to be truthful and demonstrate certain reactive attitudes if they are not. Trust and the accompanying willingness to these reactive attitudes can then provide speakers with a reason to be trustworthy. So through ignoring interlocutors’ engagement with the communicative process, the existing debate misses the possibility that it is an audience’s trusting a speaker that makes it reasonable for the audience to accept what the speaker says.

Epistemological theories of testimony aim to explain our acquisition of knowledge from testimony; specifically, they aim to explain our acquisition of knowledge whose content we come to believe through accepting testimony. We could not acquire knowledge in this way if it were unreasonable to reach belief through accepting testimony. However, whenever we do accept testimony, and do so not already believing its content, we run the risk of acquiring a false belief. We run this risk because communication need not have the purpose of being informative and communication which does have this purpose is still subject to error. So this raises the question of what makes it reasonable to accept testimony. In answering this question epistemological theories divide into two camps. One camp follows Hume: the risk of acquiring a false belief is reasonable when one is guided by the large body of inductive evidence that is provided by experience. According to this ‘reductive’ camp, it is reasonable to accept testimony because our experience has established correlations between testimony and truth; experience has thereby established that, on many occasions, testimony is empirical evidence for its truth.¹ The other ‘anti-reductive’ camp then claims that it is a priori that testimony is evidence for its truth.² So it is reasonable to

¹ See Hume 1777, Sect. 10.
² This is argued, for instance, by Coady (1992) and Burge (1993).
reach belief through accepting testimony unless one's experience provides reasons for thinking that doing so would lead to false belief. The debate over what makes it reasonable to reach belief through accepting testimony is thereby understood as the debate over whether an audience needs to possess empirical evidence for the truth of testimony or need merely lack empirical evidence for its falsity.

The problem with this understanding is that it ignores the fact that the testimonial relationship is often embedded in an established relationship, or can initiate a presumption of relationship. This can have a bearing on a speaker's reasons for telling what he does, and an audience's reasons for accepting the speaker's telling. In some circumstances, a speaker can tell an audience something just because the audience needs this information, and the audience can expect the speaker to view his informational dependence as a reason to be informative. When an audience has such an expectation, it is wrong to conceive of the audience's reasons as based on assessment or active monitoring of testimony. Rather, an audience's reason can be simply that the audience trusts the speaker for the truth, and trust need not satisfy either a positive or a negative evidence condition: it need not be based on evidence and can demonstrate a wilful insensitivity to the evidence. Indeed there is a tension between acting on trust and acting on evidence that is illustrated in the idea that one does not actually trust someone to do something if one only believes they will do it when one has evidence that they will. However, if trust based reasons need not be reasons of evidence, then the existing debate ignores an important possibility. That is, through ignoring the nature of the relationship that audiences can have with speakers, what is missed is the possibility that an audience trusting a speaker can make it reasonable for the audience to accept the trusted speaker's testimony.

The paper is structured as follows. In section two I outline an account of trust, in section three I show how trust so understood is a reason providing state, and in section four I consider a number of objections to this idea. In the next section, I introduce the idea that the testimonial relationship might be important to epistemology through considering Richard Moran's account of how testimony provides a distinctive reason for belief. In conclusion I situate the idea of trust-based reasons with respect to Moran's assurance theory, and reductive and anti-reductive theories of testimony.

For instance, Burge's Acceptance Principle: 'A person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as true and that is intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so' (Burge 1993, p. 467).
1. Telling—The Assurance View

Reductive and anti-reductive theories of testimony, Moran argues, can be grouped together as evidential theories because on both accounts it is an audience's evidence that makes it reasonable for the audience to accept a speaker's telling. The issue that divides these theories is whether it is a priori that testimony is evidence, so that an audience need only monitor for falsity, or whether the evidence of testimony is inductively established, so that reasonable acceptance requires some assessment of truth. Moran's contention is that whilst testimony can be treated as evidence, to view it this way is to misconceive its epistemology through providing no place for the central testimonial relation, which is a speaker telling an audience something and the audience believing the speaker.

Suppose that evidential theories are correct and that the epistemic value of testimony is its value as evidence. Ordinarily, testimony is evidence for its truth, irrespective of whether this evidence is a priori or empirical, just because testimony is evidence for belief; that is, a speaker's testimony to \(p\) is evidence for \(p\) only because it is evidence for the speaker believing that \(p\). Consequently, a problem with the starting supposition is that testimony is intentionally produced. When the police officer learns that the handkerchief found at the crime scene was deliberately left there to arouse certain suspicions this discredits it as evidence. It is discredited by the fact that it was intended to be evidence. Thus, Moran argues, 'if we are considering speech as evidence, we will have eventually to face the question of how recognition of its intentional character could ever enhance rather than distract from its epistemic value' (Moran 2006, p. 277). However, rather than undermine its epistemic value, the intentional character of testimony is arguably essential to this value. This is shown by Grice's contrast between showing 'a photograph of Mr Y displaying undue familiarity to Mrs X' and drawing 'a picture of Mr Y behaving in this manner'. The photograph is evidence and this is to say that its epistemic value is independent of the fact that it is shown: it would let Mr X know the facts were he to discover it accidentally. However, this is not true of the picture. The picture is not presented as evidence and it gives Mr X a reason to believe his wife is having an affair only if he recognises that it was produced with the intention of telling him just this.

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This is the case, Moran claims, with testimony. A speaker’s telling that \( p \) provides more than (doctored) evidence that \( p \)—it constitutes a reason for believing that \( p \)—because and in so far as the speaker intends it to provide this, where a speaker’s intentions can suffice for this only by their constituting an explicit assumption of responsibility. With this addition Moran refines Grice’s account of telling: in telling an audience that \( p \), a speaker intends the audience to believe that \( p \), and to believe that \( p \) because the speaker intends this and the audience recognises this intention as an assumption of responsibility. When an audience fulfils this speaker-intention, the audience does not merely accept what is told, the audience does so because the audience believes the speaker. This is Moran’s assurance view of testimony: in telling an audience that \( p \), a speaker intends the audience to believe him and the audience to thereby conceive his intention that the audience believe that \( p \) as an assumption of responsibility. In this way the speaker presents his telling not as evidence but as assurance, where a speaker’s assurance that \( p \) is something like the speaker’s promise that \( p \) is true.

Moran’s criticism of evidential theories, I think, is very well made. Moreover, it is a criticism I want to press in considering how an assurance view can respond to a problematic dilemma that evidential theories present.\(^5\)

The dilemma starts with the problem that speakers lie and in lying a speaker equally intends an audience accept what is told because the audience recognises that this is what the speaker intends. Consequently, that an audience recognises that a speaker intends the audience to believe that \( p \) does not suffice to give the audience a reason to believe that \( p \). Moran realises this and so adds that in telling that \( p \), a speaker intends an audience to take this intention as a reason for belief because the audience construes the telling as a certain assumption of responsibility. The problem is that lies purport to be sincere and an audience who was gulled by this pretence of sincerity would equally construe a speaker’s lie as an assumption of responsibility. So the set of intentions Moran describes should be insufficient to move an audience to belief unless the audience further trusts the speaker not to lie. Consequently, a speaker’s telling an audience that \( p \) gives this audience the kind of reason for belief the assurance theory describes only if the audience trusts the speaker not to lie. However, this then raises the question: what justifies an audience’s trust? At this juncture, evidential views assert themselves since these views seem to exhaust the options available for an audience being justified in trust. Thus the dilemma evidential views

\(^5\)See Faulkner forthcoming b.
present is that the reason for belief proposed by an assurance view is conditional on an audience trusting a speaker not to lie, and trust must be justified in an evidential way; that is, an audience is justified in trusting a speaker either because the audience has evidence that the speaker is trustworthy, or because the audience lacks evidence that the speaker is untrustworthy and is justified in trusting in the absence of such evidence. Either way there ceases to be a distinctive assurance position.

The resolution of this dilemma I will propose is that evidential views do not exhaust the options available. Trust cannot solely be equated with a belief in trustworthiness; trust can be a different attitude to belief. Moreover, this is revealed in the expectations that interlocutors can bring to communication, and which the assurance theory is at pains to explain. ‘It is an insult and it may be an injury not to be believed’ Anscombe observes (1979, p. 150, quoted in Moran 2006, p. 301). The offence remains, Moran suggests, if an audience merely believes what is said on the evidence of a speaker’s telling it.

The offence lies in his [the audience’s] refusing to accept what the speaker freely and explicitly offers him, in favor of privately attending to what the speaker’s action passively reveals. (Moran 2006, p. 301)

This explanation, I would like to suggest, is a good one only when a certain presumption is in place about the kind of relationship speaker and audience enjoy. After all, do I care that a stranger accepts my directions merely because she judges me to be a competent local? The root of the offence in ‘privately attending to what the speaker’s action passively reveals’ is that it undercuts presumptions of relationship. What I want to pursue here is the connection made by Anscombe that ‘we can see believing someone (in the particular case) as trusting him for the truth — in the particular case’ (1979, p. 151, my emphasis). My suggestion is that disbelieving a speaker causes offence through undercutting the presumption of relationship that is made in trust. Accordingly, I want to suggest, that what epistemically distinguishes testimony is that it offers trust based reasons for belief. So what is needed to address the problematic dilemma is some account of the nature of trust.

2. An analysis of trust

One reason we can have for accepting testimony is that we know that what is said is true. ‘Here comes the bus’ might be said to draw an audience’s attention to the bus that the speaker and the audience have been waiting for. The audience need not trust the speaker to tell the truth: he can see that the speaker is doing so. Trust implies dependence. Often
the dependence is practical as when in trusting you to arrive on time
my successfully making a connecting flight might depend on your
doing so. And often we depend in more ways than one: in trusting you
to arrive on time, I might put my good feelings towards you at risk. In
general, to say that A depends on S φ-ing is just to say that S’s φ-ing is
necessary for A pursuing some good or holding some attitude. The
dependence at issue in telling is informational: the starting point is an
audience depending on a speaker for information and so depending on
the speaker telling the truth. Focusing on these cases, we can judge that
a speaker’s testimony is true and so trust it even if we think that the
speaker is untrustworthy. In this case, we would believe what is said but
we would not believe the speaker—we would not treat the speaker’s
telling as assurance. So there are different ways to trust, related to
Moran’s distinction between believing a person and believing a proposi-
tion; explaining how believing someone amounts to trusting them for
the truth then requires attention to these differences.
On one understanding of trust, to trust is simply to make a judgement
of reliability in a situation of known dependence. Thus, Hollis remarks:

[W]e trust one another to behave predictably in a sense that applies equally
to the natural world at large. I trust my apple tree to bear apples, not oranges.
I trust its boughs to bear my weight, if they look strong and healthy. I trust
my reliable old alarm clock to wake me tomorrow, as it did yesterday. I trust
you to wear a blue shirt again today, never having seen you in anything else.
(Hollis 1998, p. 10)

To say an audience trusts a speaker’s telling that p on this understand-
ing is just to say that the audience is dependent on the speaker for the
information as to whether p, knows that this is so, and judges that p is
probably true on the basis of the speaker telling it. Let me follow Hollis
in labelling this broad sense of trust predictive, which might then be
defined thus:

A trusts S to φ (in the predictive sense) if and only if

1. A knowingly depends on S φ-ing and

2. A expects S to φ (where A expects this in the sense that A pre-
dicts that S will φ).

Trust is a combination of known dependence (condition 1) and expec-
tation (condition 2). The expectation here is a matter of a belief about
the future, an inductive inference. And when this is not possible, all
that remains is reliance; that is, A relies on S to φ if and only if A
depends in some respect on S φ-ing. Thus, trust in this broad predictive sense demonstrates a willingness to rely because one predicts reliance will be profitable.

Predictive trust is not sufficient for belief in a speaker. If believing a speaker is to be understood as trusting them for the truth, in line with Anscombe’s suggestion, then this trust must have particular grounds. For suppose an audience predicted the truth of a speaker’s testimony on the basis of independent evidence of the speaker proving reliable in the past, the audience would then trust the speaker’s testimony only in the sense that the audience might trust a branch to hold his weight or his car to start; but as noted we can trust what someone says is true on this basis without actually trusting them. So in telling an audience something a speaker does not invite an audience to trust him in this way; and in trusting a speaker for the truth, an audience does not merely expect a speaker to tell the truth, the audience expects this of the speaker and holds the speaker to this expectation. Expectation can be an evaluative attitude, which can be distinguished not by its relation to belief but through its association with certain reactive emotions.

The crucial element, I would suggest, is attitudinal: to hold someone to an expectation is essentially to be susceptible to a certain range of emotions in the case that the expectation is not fulfilled, or to believe that the violation of the expectation would make it appropriate for one to be subject to those emotions. (Wallace 1994, p. 21)

The betrayal of trust is strongly associated with a feeling of resentment. Consequently, I suggest, it is the idea of expecting things of speakers and holding speakers to these expectations which is needed for identifying the ‘thicker’ notion of trust that is trusting a speaker, where this is contrasted with merely trusting the speaker’s testimony. The thicker notion of trust needed is one where an audience (as truster) expects a speaker (as trusted) to try to say what is true because the audience is dependent on the speaker doing so. That this expectation is then more than a statement of the audience’s subjective probabilities is demonstrated by the audience being prone to resent the speaker were the audience’s trust to be let down.

The thick sense of trust invited when a speaker tells an audience something can be labelled affective trust and defined thus:

4 For example, chased by the law the bandit has no choice but to rely on the rickety rope bridge spanning the ravine; it would be wrong to say the bandit trusts the bridge—he does not expect to make it to the other side—but this is a desperate situation and his reliance is forced.
A trusts S to φ (in the affective sense) if and only if

1. A knowingly depends on S- ing and

2. A expects S's knowing that A depends on S- ing to motivate S to φ (where A expects this in the sense that he expects it of S).\(^7\)

Trust in both the affective and predictive senses implies known dependence. Condition (1) is constant across both. Trust in both the affective and predictive senses implies expectation. In both, A expects S to φ.\(^8\) However, the nature and grounds of the expectations stated in condition (2) differ across these senses of trust and it is important to make these differences clear.

First, condition (2) describes the nature of A’s expecting S to be motivated to φ in terms of A expecting this of S. The contrast here is with the expectation that is constitutive of predictive trust. The contrast is between expecting that something will happen and expecting something of someone. When we expect something of someone we hold them to this expectation where to do this, as the quotation from Wallace states, is to be susceptible to certain reactive attitudes if they do not do what is expected. Thus A’s expectation of S, stated in condition (2) of affective trust, needs to be understood in terms of A being susceptible to certain reactive attitudes were S to show no motivation to φ. The general reactive attitude in play here is resentment: in affectively trusting S to φ, A will be prone to resentment were S to show no inclination to φ. However, we can resent one another in all sorts of ways and for all sorts of reasons. For example, consider the case of the overly suspicious Mr X who is convinced that his beautiful wife will leave him for another man. Mr X’s anxiety always fixes itself on particular individuals he imagines his wife has amorous feelings towards, and presently Mr X is convinced that his wife seeks a liaison with Mr Y. His paranoia is such that he hires a private investigator to follow and photograph Mrs X. It would be unnatural in this case to describe Mr X as trusting his wife not to have an affect; even if he predicts that she will not, given that he has made it clear to her that she is being scrutinised. Nevertheless, Mr X

\(^7\)One complexity I will ignore hereafter: if S tried to φ but failed through no fault of his own, then A should not resent S. So condition (2) should read ‘A expects that S’s knowing (1) to motivate S to (attempt to) φ’.

\(^8\)It is also worth noting that the analysandum in both predictive and affective trust is the narrow ‘A trusts S to φ’ rather than the broader ‘A trusts S’. This is because one can trust someone to do something without trusting them in general and, indeed, trust someone in general without trusting them to some particular thing. However, it is arguably that trusting someone in general is accountable in terms of trusting them to do something. ‘A trusts S’ could be read as ‘For some significant range of φ, A trusts S to φ’.
is knowingly dependent on his wife’s fidelity, knows that she recognises this, thinks that she should be faithful, and, on finding the private investigator’s photographs, Mr X might have many of the reactive attitudes of the ‘wronged’ husband—including that of resentment. However, Mr X’s resentment has a different phenomenology to that provoked by affective trust being let down. This is because the reactive attitude distinctive to affective trust’s betrayal requires the presumption that the trusted will act in the way expected. Mr X’s resentment does not occur with this presumption as background, and this is just to say that Mr X never trusted his wife in the first place. Thus, I suggest that in affective trust A expects S to φ in the sense that A is susceptible to those reactive attitudes that characterize the defeat of A’s presumption that S will φ because A depends on S doing so. This defines an attitude one can take towards another person only when one knowingly depends on them doing something. Since our knowing dependence is necessary to our holding others to this expectation, and this expectation is the attitude constitutive of affective trust, the attitude it expresses is just that of trust in this thick sense. Thus the expectation could equally and simply be defined in terms of a susceptibility to those reactive attitudes that characterize trust’s betrayal. Formulated in this way affective trust figures in both the analysandum and analysans, and what is thereby proposed is that affective trust is a basic non-reducible attitude.

Second, condition (2) states that the ground of the expectation that A has of S is A’s belief that S can recognise A’s dependence on S φ-ing. Three things should be remarked about this ground. First, it is different from the ground of the expectation had in predictive trust—which is a background assessment of the probabilities of S φ-ing or the evidence for this—in that it is reflexive: affective trust is grounded by A’s belief that S can recognise something about A. Affective trust involves a belief about another subject’s cognisance of their relation to oneself. This relation might be limited to a sole occasion of depending on that subject φ-ing, but it will probably not be so limited; and either way, affective trust thereby involves a belief about a trusted party’s attitudes to oneself. Second, through engaging S’s attitudes towards himself A introduces a further level of dependence on S’s actions, since A now

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9 This is slightly complicated by the fact that it could still be true of Mr X that he does trust his wife in some respects, it is just that he does not trust her to be faithful. So suppose that his not trusting her in this respect is part of a more general breakdown of trust. See previous note.

10 Compare Hardin’s encapsulated interest model of trust, which makes trust turn ‘on whether my own interests are encapsulated in the interests of the Trusted, that is, on whether the Trusted counts my interests as partly his or her own interests just because they are my interests’ (Hardin 2006, p. 19).
depends on S conceiving of A’s dependence in a certain way, namely as a reason to φ, in addition to depending on S φ-ing. This further level of dependence is introduced because were S not to conceive of A’s dependence in this way—for instance if S were to conceive of it as an opportunity for S’s own advancement—A would be exposed in all the ways A’s dependence on S φ-ing entails and would be further vulnerable to that negative reactive attitude characteristic of trust being let down. So A’s belief that S recognises A’s dependence implies that S also recognises that A is dependent in this further way; it implies that S can recognise the attitude of trust that A takes towards A’s dependence on S φ-ing. Third, A’s belief that S recognises A’s (trusting) dependence on S φ-ing does not fully explain A’s expectation because A’s expectation is further that S will be motivated to φ for just this reason. Thus A’s expectation is grounded by the conjunction of the belief that S recognises A’s dependence on S φ-ing and the presumption that this will move S to φ. This conjunctive ground then implies a further presumption. In presuming that S will be motivated to φ by A’s dependence on S φ-ing, and believing that S can in fact recognise A’s dependence, A comes to presume that S will indeed φ. This implied presumption, made for these reasons, is just the presumption that S will fulfil the expectation that A holds him to—that S will prove trustworthy. Thus taking an attitude of affective trust involves presuming that the trusted will prove trustworthy. This presumption is then necessary, as the case of the suspicious husband illustrated, for that reactive attitude distinctive to affective trust’s betrayal.

Now, that affective trust implies a presumption of trustworthiness is important, because presumption is not constrained in the same way as belief but can nevertheless figure as a reason for belief. This, I will argue, can then explain how trusting a speaker in the way the speaker intends in telling, can give an audience a justifying reason for believing what a speaker tells him.

12 The idea that trust involves a presumption that the trusted will be moved is also suggested by Jones, who states that in trust A has ‘the expectation that S will be directly and favourably moved by the thought that A is counting on her’ (Jones 1996, p. 6). Similarly Horsburgh’s identifies a notion of trust, therapeutic trust, which ‘presupposes a belief in the possibility of stirring someone’s conscience to an extent sufficient to affect his conduct’ (Horsburgh 1960, p. 346).
3. The epistemology of trust

When we accept what others tell us because we depend on them for information, we expect the truth; but as the last section made clear, there are different ways in which this may be expected. There are different ways in which we can trust.

The epistemology of predictive trust is straightforward. In trusting my car to start, I depend on it starting and believe it to be dependable in this respect—I predict that it will start. Similarly, in predictively trusting a speaker’s telling, an audience depends on it for information and believes that it is dependable in this respect—the audience predicts that what is told is true. An audience who predictively trusts a speaker’s telling thereby has a reason to believe what is told because to trust in this sense is just to predict that what is told is true, given what else is believed about the speaker’s telling. Whether this reason is a good one, whether it could justify the audience believing what is told, then depends on whether the attitude of predictive trust is justified. The question of what justifies predictive trust thus returns to the debate between evidential theories of testimony. According to reductive theories, it is an audience’s past experience of testimony that provides evidence for predicting testimony to be true. Trust is justified on the basis of the evidence the audience possesses. According to anti-reductive theories, on the other hand, it is a priori that testimony is evidence for its truth, so an audience is justified in predictively trusting testimony given only an absence of counterevidence. However, this divergence aside, there is substantial theoretical agreement: where trust is predictive its justification is straightforwardly evidential.

By contrast, it is an essential feature of affective trust that it need not be evidence based. We can choose to affectively trust in a way that we cannot choose to believe, or equivalently predict. Such choice can be illustrated by the case of a reformer who employs someone recently discharged from prison for petty theft. The reformer can trust her new employee to be honest and not steal despite her evidence to the contrary. In this case, the reformer trusts her new employee in the thicker sense of trust I have labelled affective. She can choose to accept her new employee’s statement that he will not steal without assessing his testimony as evidence for its truth, and ignoring the evidence she possess for its falsity. In doing so, the reformer expects her new employee not to steal, not as prediction, but in the sense that this is something she expects of him and will hold him to. This expectation is then grounded

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13 This example comes from Holton 1994, p. 63.
by the belief that her new employee will recognise her vulnerability and the presumption that he will respond to this in the way that she expects. The reformer does not need evidence to support this presumption—she need not have assessed his character, for instance—she simply chooses to trust.\(^\text{14}\)

This is not to claim that one can always choose to trust, and so that one can trust come what may; and nor is it to claim that there are no normative constraints on trust. Our ability to trust is limited if individually variable; and more importantly affective trust expresses an attitude that is open to epistemic evaluation: like predictive trust and belief, affective trust can be either justified or unjustified. Affective trust would be unjustified in so far as the belief and presumption that ground its constitutive expectation were unjustified. This is the belief that the trust situation is such that dependence can be recognised and the presumption that the trusted will prove responsive to it. Taking the schematic case of A trusting S to φ, A’s affective trust will be unjustified if: either A is not justified in believing that S can recognise A’s dependence on S φ-ing; or A is not justified in presuming that this will move S to φ.

In this way, affective trust can be as fallible and as prone to error and irrationality as belief.\(^\text{15}\) However, whether A’s presumption about S is unjustified it is not so straightforward, because extending trust, and so making the presumption trust involves, can be a way of creating the conditions for this presumption’s fulfilment. In this way, the reformer hopes to reintegrate the ex-convict into the community (which might be defined as those willing to extend and respond to trust). Nevertheless, there can be clear and salient evidence that the presumption needed for trust is false. Certainly, A’s presumption that S will be motivated to φ by A’s dependence on S doing so would be unjustified if the evidence obliged A to believe that S will not φ. This is the limiting case: the reformer has evidence that the ex-convict will steal but this evidence does not oblige the reformer to believe that he will steal. However, one can imagine a point before obligation when the evidence of the ex-convict’s lack of reform would render continued trust unjustified. Perhaps, the most that can be said here is that the evidence can be such as to render affective trust unjustified, but when it does so is not

\(^{\text{14}}\) That said trust is often compelled. But this is equally explained by its being grounded on the presumption that another will be responsive to one’s dependence: trust can be compelled because our relationships can compel this presumption. Consider, for instance, romance.

\(^{\text{15}}\) For instance in Ian McEwan’s fictional account of de Clerambault’s syndrome, the sufferer Jed Parry believes that the object of his affections, the narrator Joe Rose, recognises his amorous feelings, and so his dependence on their reciprocation, from their first encounter. See McEwan 1997.
something that can be specified in terms of a rule—or the only rule which can be specified is the limiting one italicised.

What, then, justifies taking an attitude of affective trust? And how does affective trust justify an audience believing what a speaker tells him? In principle the answers are simple. Affective trust is justified in so far as its grounding belief and presumption are justified. However, whilst the justification of the belief that grounds any instance of affective trust can be explained in evidential terms, the justification of affective trust is not straightforwardly evidential because its grounding presumption can run counter to the evidence. Consequently, a more complex epistemological story needs to be told about what justifies trust. To tell this story, I would like to concentrate first on the question of what makes affective trust reasonable. An account of the reasonableness of an action or attitude is internalist: it will detail the subject’s reasons for acting or holding the attitude. Second, some defence will be required of the claim that a subject’s reasons for affectively trusting are epistemic, where a reason is epistemic if it is a reason for belief or a reason for thinking that a proposition is true—which in this case will be the proposition accepted on a speaker’s testimony. Third, having established that we always have epistemic reasons for affectively trusting speakers to tell the truth, I would like to consider whether and when these reasons are epistemically good or justifying.16 As I understand it, a minimum condition on a reason being justifying is that it explains a belief’s truth, when in fact that belief is true.17 The reasons we have for affective trust, I want to claim, can satisfy this minimal condition because they satisfy the stronger condition of explaining the reliability of forming belief on trust.

First, what makes affective trust reasonable? What motivating reason can A have for affectively trusting S to φ? The obvious answer would be the belief that S is trustworthy, which is the belief that S will fulfil the expectation that A has in trust, and where trust is affective this would be the belief that S will φ because A depends on S doing so. The problem with this answer is that we can choose to affectively trust and this belief is not a presupposition of this choice. Moreover, it is key to the nature of trust that this belief is not necessary for the reasonableness of trust. The belief that S will φ because A depends on S φ-ing is a belief

16 That is, I would like to break down the question of justification into the questions of a truster’s motivating and justifying reasons for trust, see Pettit and Smith 1990, p. 566.

17 This is the sense of justifying that Burge captures with the notion of entitlement he defines in his 1993. To wit: a belief is supported by an entitlement if its method of acquisition can be rationally described such that its truth is explained, when indeed the belief is true.
about the kind of relationship that A has with S. However, trust can be extended in the absence of relationship: it can function to create, as well as sustain, relationships. Certainly, affective trust needs something to make it reasonable: the reformer’s trust would fail to be reasonable, or I think possible, if she believed her new employee to be untrustworthy. However, the reformer still goes out on a limb: she does not have the evidence to believe that her new employee will view her dependence in the way that she expects. What renders her trust reasonable, if indeed it is reasonable, is the presumption that her new employee is trustworthy. Thus what makes the attitude of affective trust reasonable is not the belief that the trusted is trustworthy but the presumption that this is so.

However, as the last section argued, the presumption of trustworthiness is an implication of affective trust. In affectively trusting S to φ, A expects S to be motivated to φ by recognising that A depends on S φ-ing. Trust is A’s having this expectation in a situation of knowingly depending on S φ-ing. In this situation, A’s trust will be grounded by the belief that S can indeed recognise A’s dependence and the presumption that S will see this as a reason to φ. This presumption has a conditional form—were S to recognise my dependence, he would be moved to φ—with the grounding belief satisfying the antecedent of this conditional. Thus, in the trust situation, the grounds of A trusting S to φ imply the presumption that S will be moved to φ for reasons of A’s dependence. Of course, this is not to suggest that in trust we reason in this way. Rather, the claim is that the attitude of affective trust implies the presumption that the trusted is trustworthy: one cannot adopt this attitude without making this presumption. Since this presumption then makes the attitude of trust reasonable, through implying a presumption of trustworthiness affective trust gives rise to a motivating reason for itself, and in this limited way its reasonableness is self-supporting.

The same logic then explains how affective trust provides an audience with a reason for believing what a speaker tells him. If an audience affectively trusts a speaker to try and say what is true, his reason for believing that p will be just that the speaker intends that he believe that p. This will be the audience’s reason for accepting the speaker’s telling because in trust he believes that the speaker recognises his need to know whether p, and presumes that the speaker’s telling him that p is a response to this. In affectively trusting a speaker to try and say what is true an audience thereby comes to presume that the speaker is trustworthy. This presumption provides a motivating reason for accepting the speaker’s telling in exactly the same way that the belief that the
speaker is trustworthy would do. Affective trust, in providing a self-supporting reason for itself, thereby provides a reason for accepting what a trusted speaker tells.  

Second, the presumption that a speaker is trustworthy provides an epistemic reason for accepting what the speaker says; that is, it provides a reason for thinking that what is said is true. ‘Trustworthiness’ is being understood as the fulfilment by the trusted of the expectation the truster has in trust. In the case of affective trust, this is A’s expectation that S will be moved by A’s need to know whether p. So if S tells A that p, the presumption that S is trustworthy is the presumption that S tells him that p because p. Trustworthiness hereby requires more than sincerity — S could be sincere and yet succeed in intentionally deceiving A by implication — it requires S address A’s need to know whether p and so respond to A’s epistemic dependence. This is shown by the fact that A could be liable to the reactive attitude characteristic of trust being let down even if S sincerely got things wrong, and would almost certainly be so liable if S was careless in getting things wrong. This is not to make trustworthiness a factive notion; a speaker can do his best and still be in error. However, trustworthiness suffices for probable truth: other things being equal, if a trustworthy speaker tells one that p, then p is true. Thus, the presumption that a speaker is trustworthy, on an occasion, gives an audience an epistemic reason to accept what that speaker tells him, on that occasion.

Third, the epistemic reason that the attitude of affective trust supplies for accepting what a speaker says can be an epistemically good or justificatory reason. It would be so when the presumptions involved in trust are fulfilled. In adopting an attitude of trust, A makes a presumption about how S will view A’s dependence on S φ-ing, namely that S will see this dependence as a reason to φ. And when A trusts S to be informative, in a context of needing to know whether p, A makes the presumption that S will view A’s need for this information as a reason to be informative. Suppose that S fulfils this presumption of A’s affective trust. In this situation, S will indeed try to inform A whether or not

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18 It is worth noting that this account of trust-based reasons has an influential precedent in Lewis 1969, which describes how an agent’s higher order attitudes can justify action and so make coordination rationally achievable. Now the acceptance of testimony is not a coordination problem as Lewis understands it unless it is further claimed that there is a coincidence of interest between speakers and audiences. However, something like this further claim is presumed with the attitude of affective trust.

19 Similarly, Williams claims that ‘recriminations, loss of reputation, apologies, forms of compensation will be in place, certainly if the speaker was insincere, probably if he was careless, possibly if he was merely wrong’ (Williams 2002, p. 80).
p is the case. Consequently, S’s testimony should be reliable in the subjunctive sense that if p were false, S would not tell A that p, and if, in changed circumstances p remained true, S would still tell A that p. Thus, the reason provided by A’s trust will explain the truth of what A accepts, when what S tells is true because S fulfils the presumptions A makes in trust, and this suffices for A’s reason being justificatory on these occasions.

It is important to recognise that this is a genuinely explanatory account of A’s coming to accept a truth. This is because the act of trusting figures as part of the explanation of the fulfilment of the presumption made in trust. Put simply, it is not merely that A’s reason is justificatory because it individuates a reliable method, it is also the case that A’s reason can secure the reliability of this method. To see how it secures this, first recall that A’s affective trust involves an expectation of responsiveness: A expects it of S that S will respond to his dependence in a certain way. This expectation renders A vulnerable to a distinctive reactive attitude because it involves a presumption of relationship: it involves the presumption that S will identify with A’s concerns and care for A’s trust sufficiently to see A’s dependence a certain way. In fulfilling this presumption S’s action expresses agreement that S’s relationship with A is, or should be, structured by this presumption of trust. So it is facts about the relationship that A and S have, or desire to have, that determine whether the presumption A makes in trust is fulfilled. However, acts of trust are instrumental in creating and sustaining relationships that support such presumptions. Acts of affective trust accomplish this through their evaluative or normative dimension. In affectively trusting S to φ, A takes an evaluative stance towards S. This evaluative stance is expressed positively in A’s presuming that A’s relationship with S is such that S will be responsive to A’s trust and will prove trustworthy. In trusting S, A presents S with the opportunity of sharing this view of things, of having or continuing to have a relationship based on the presumption that dependence can impose certain obligations. And this evaluative stance is expressed negatively in the propensity to resent S, in that way particular to trust’s betrayal, were S not to φ. So if S agrees with the presumption of A’s trust, then S will take himself to possess a positive reason to be trustworthy. That is, S will take A’s dependence on S φ-ing to provide a reason to φ. However, even if S rejects the pre-

20 In this way, I agree with Baier that trust involves ‘reliance on [another’s] goodwill towards one, as distinct from their dependable habits’ (Baier 1986, p. 234).

21 This reason has a ‘moral flavour’, but is not moral since it can be too much shaped by ‘the local requirements of a particular society’ (Hollis 1998, p. 11).
sumption of A’s trust, the resentment that any untrustworthy behaviour would provoke gives S a negative or instrumental reason to $\phi$.\textsuperscript{22} So either way S possesses a reason to $\phi$. If S responds to either of these reasons and so $\phi$s, then there exists an explanatory connection between A’s trusting S to $\phi$ and S in fact $\phi$-ing. Thus, the reason A’s attitude of affective trust is justificatory is that it explains the reliability of the policy of acceptance—when its presumptions are fulfilled.

In the final section of this paper I will return to the debate between assurance and evidential theories of testimony, but first I want first to consider certain objections to this analysis and epistemology of trust.

4. Objections

There are four connected objections to the idea of trust-based reasons that I would like to consider. First, we can think that someone should do something and yet will not. So we can expect someone to do something (in the sense of expecting this of them) without presuming that they will do this thing. Second, trusting a speaker who tells one something is a way of acquiring belief. We cannot choose what to believe, so we cannot choose who to trust. Third, trust does provide reasons but to the extent these reasons are chosen they are non-evidential and so epistemically irrelevant. Fourth, we cannot always choose to trust, we only trust some people, but this suggests that our trust is evidentially guided and it is the discriminations we make in this regard that epistemically support trust-based belief. These are the objections in brief. The fourth objection is key but the general sentiment behind all of them is similar, namely that nothing epistemological can be extracted from an account of affective trust. This is what evidential theories would predict: talk of affective trust merely details the attitudes that communicators have towards one another with the epistemological options being captured by evidential theories. By contrast, a central claim of this paper, and part of the insight of assurance views, is that the attitudes we bring to communication do have epistemic significance. Consider then these four objections.

First, people do not always do what they should do. So there is no contradiction in believing that someone should do something yet will not do it. Take our truster A and suppose that circumstances force A to

\textsuperscript{22} Similarly, Pettit observes (1995, p. 216): ‘The trustee is likely to have a desire, intrinsic or instrumental, for the good opinion of the trustor and of witnesses to the act of trust. The desire for that good opinion will tend to give the trustee reason to act in the way in which the trustor relies on him to act.’
rely on S φ-ing. In these circumstances, A might not expect S to φ but might nevertheless expect it of S that he φs; that is, A might predict S will not φ despite thinking that he should φ and feeling it appropriate to resent S for not φ-ing. Since this latter expectation characterizes affective trust and the former expectation predictive trust, one could say that A affectively trusts S to φ even though A does not predictively trust S to φ. In this case, the objection concludes, since one cannot presume something is true at the same time as believing it to be false, A must be able to affectively trust S to φ without presuming that S will φ. The most that affective trust can imply is hope: in expecting it of S that S φs, A thinks that S should φ, might resent S if he does not φ, and hopes that S φs.

What is right about this objection is that one cannot presume that p is true, though one can hope that it is, if one believes that p is false. However, this shows that A cannot affectively trust S to φ at the same time as believing that S will not do so. It does not show that the expectation constitutive of affective trust merely requires hope and a propensity to resent. This constitutive expectation is defined in terms of the susceptibility to certain reactive attitudes, or belief that these attitudes are appropriate, and its implying a presumption of trustworthiness is necessary to both the identity and appropriateness of these reactive attitudes. Nevertheless, that hope does not suffice can be shown by means of an example. Consider the heroine A who has been chased off the edge of a cliff by villain S so that A is now entirely dependent on S saving her from falling to her death.\footnote{Thanks to Richard Holton for this example.} In this circumstance the dependence condition (1) of affective trust is satisfied: A is knowingly dependent on S saving her. And the replacement condition (2*) proposed by the objection is satisfied: A expects it of S that he save her, hopes that he will save her, and feels that resentment would be appropriate were he not to do so. However, I hope that it is clear that A does not trust S to save her \textit{in any sense of trust}. This is not merely because A does not predict that S will save her. It is also because the evidence of S’s villainy renders the heroine unable to presume that S will be responsive to her dependence.\footnote{This is a black and white movie where the villain is outside of the moral community, and the heroine is rational.} Without this grounding presumption there can be no presumption of trustworthiness, and so whatever resentment or anger might be appropriate to S’s villainy, it is phenomenologically not that provoked by a breach of trust since this reactive attitude would need A to presume that S would save her in these circumstances. Thus the
heroine might think that \( S \) should save her, but she cannot expect this of him in that way characteristic of trust since this expectation is characterized in terms of susceptibility to these reactive attitudes. So to say that \( A \) cannot presume that \( S \) will be moved by her dependence is to say that \( A \) is unable to trust \( S \) to save her, and at the same time it is to describe \( S \)'s villainy. Affectively trusting someone to do something requires that one bring a certain set of beliefs and presumptions to the trust situation. This background is not present for the heroine who has just been chased off the edge of the cliff by the villain.

Second, suppose that it is allowed that affective trust implies a presumption of trustworthiness. The problem then becomes that our capacity to choose whom to affectively trust is at odds with the fact that we cannot choose what to believe. Belief is rarely subject to the will and belief in the face of salient evidence is impossible, or should be so. For instance, one can choose to think better of someone’s actions but one could not choose to believe that they did not act as they did when one has been (perceptually) confronted by these actions. One can rarely choose to believe but one can choose to affectively trust and trust is a way of acquiring belief: an audience who affectively trusts a speaker to be informative will thereby come to believe what the speaker says. But then it appears that one could choose to believe any proposition simply by finding a speaker who was willing to tell one that proposition and then choosing to trust this speaker. Belief is not, and should not be, so subject to the will. Moreover, the situation is worse. The nature of affective trust, I argued, is such that one can choose to trust even given reasons for not trusting—for instance, \( A \) can trust \( S \) to \( \phi \) even given evidence that \( S \) will not \( \phi \), as in the case of the reformer—and one can be reasonable in this because affective trust generates reasons for itself. So it is not even that the wilful believer can be convicted of plain irrationality. Rather, it seems that one can choose to believe and that it can be reasonable to do so despite the evidence. The problem is that without qualification these claims are implausible.

This is less of a problem, I think, than it appears. First, I think that it should be denied that affective trust immediately implies believing what a speaker says. What affective trust implies is acceptance rather than belief. This distinction is Cohen’s and, in his terms, to believe that \( p \) is to have

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\text{a disposition … to feel it true that } p \text{ and false that not-} p, \text{ whether or not one is willing to act, speak or reason accordingly. (Cohen 1992, p. 4)}
\]

By contrast ‘to accept that \( p \) is to have or adopt a policy of … including that proposition … among one’s premises for deciding what to do or
think in a particular context, whether or not one feels it to be true that $p'$ (Cohen 1992, p. 4). What trust involves is a policy: it consists of committing oneself to treating what a speaker says as true, irrespective of whether or not one also believes what is said. However, if one can accept a proposition without believing it to be true, one can choose to affectively trust a speaker and so choose to accept what the speaker says without this engaging the epistemic obligations associated with belief and without implying an implausible voluntarism about belief. We have a greater voluntary control over trust than belief because we have a greater voluntary control over acceptance than belief. However, whilst this blunts the objection, it does not remove it because the policy of treating what a speaker says as true cannot consistently avoid belief, and it is not clear that the attempt to do so would satisfy the speaker’s expectation of being believed. Thus, second, I think it should be conceded to the objection that our ability to trust is both psychologically and normatively constrained. First, it is true that one cannot always choose to trust. If $A$ trusts $S$ to $/H9278$, then $A$ cannot believe that $S$ will not $/H9278$, and must be able to presume that his dependence on $S$-ing will motivate $S$ to $/H9278$. However, this is a presumption that becomes difficult to make if $A$ has evidence that $S$ will not $/H9278$ or will not be motivated to $/H9278$ by his dependence. Ordinarily, trust will thereby only be possible when such evidence is either weak or non-salient to $A$. So it is possible to formulate a psychological generalization: the stronger and the more salient one’s reasons for believing that someone will not do something, the harder it will be to affectively trust them to do it. However, as a generalization, this statement is compatible with extreme cases of trust running counter to the evidence. The important question is then where the normative constraints on affective trust lie. I will come to this question with the fourth and central objection, but first it must be asked whether too much has already been conceded.

Third, if one can trust despite the evidence and yet it is conceded that trust is psychologically constrained, then this simply illustrates that different and conflicting reasons are at play in trust. In recognising that we can have trust based reason, what is being recognised is that we can have all sorts of different reasons for adopting the policy of accepting what a speaker says. Thus it was correctly observed that the truster’s presumption that the trusted will be responsive to his dependence is ordinarily embedded in further beliefs and presumptions about what is shared with the trusted. Trust, this objection continues, is then an umbrella term for the reasons these further beliefs and presumptions provide. For instance, one often trusts out of friendship or the belief
that it is morally or socially the right thing to do; and one can be motivated to be trustworthy by friendship and an understanding of moral and social obligation. In this way, facts about our relationships with others can provide reasons for belief because they offer grounds for judging that our view of our relationships and the obligations they generate is shared. However, these reasons are not epistemic and this is illustrated by their ready conflict with epistemic reasons. We feel this tension when we have good evidence that what our friend tells us is wrong, and the fact that our friend will be provoked by disbelief offers no reasons for thinking that what is said is true. So, this objection concludes, trust based reasons are not epistemic reasons, or at least they are not epistemic reasons unless they are based on discriminatory powers, which then carry the epistemic burden.

Clarifying the observations that prompt this objection shows where it goes wrong. Certainly we can have reasons for believing things that are not epistemic reasons; we can have reasons of friendship, for instance. However, trust based reasons are not reasons of friendship: one can affectively trust those with whom one has no prior acquaintance, as in the reformer case. Nor are trust based reasons moral reasons: one criminal could affectively trust another to do something immoral. Trust based reasons are neither moral reasons nor reasons of friendship, nor indeed the reasons supplied by any other shared set of values; rather, a trust based reason is a reason supplied by the presumption that another is trustworthy when this presumption is a consequence of affective trust. In the context of trusting a speaker for the truth, this presumption of trustworthiness provides an epistemic reason because it is the presumption that the speaker is telling the truth. What is right in this objection is that the grounding presumption of affective trust is rarely isolated. Trust is ordinarily motivated by a view of the relationship and values shared with the trusted, or what one desires to share with the trusted. However, to observe that trust is often associated with a bundle of reasons for trusting in no way implies that trust does not itself provide a distinctive reason for belief. The important issues are then how this epistemic reason engages with the evidence and the epistemic role played by our sensitivity to this evidence when we make discriminations in trust. This brings me to the fourth and most important objection.

Fourth, we cannot always choose to affectively trust; we can only affectively trust some people. So, this objection proposes, a psychologi-

25 Price is right when claimed that ‘there can quite well be a conflict between the precepts of charity and the precepts of the Ethics of Belief’ (Price 1969, p. 68).
cal pre-condition of A affectively trusting S to φ is the belief that his dependence on S φ-ing will motivate S to φ. If the reformer did not believe her new employee would be responsive to being trusted with the till, then she could no more trust him than the heroine hanging off the edge of the cliff could trust the villain who pursued her for rescue. Since not even the reformer would believe of everyone come what may that they could be trusted with the till, the reformer’s trusting the ex-convict must be based on a belief about the ex-convict’s character. We are discriminating in whom we trust and arguably it is such belief that grounds the discriminations we make in affective trust. Moreover, this is how things should be epistemically: where trust runs counter to the evidence, as in this case, it could be reasonable only in so far as it was based on a belief about probable trust-responsiveness. So unless this case simply demonstrates the reformer’s credulity, it cannot be characterized as one of choosing to trust despite the evidence. For the reformer’s action to be reasonable she must have believed that her new employee would prove trust-responsive, prior to trusting him with the till.  

However, if affective trust, considered as the sole reason for belief, is only reasonable when it is backed by such prior belief, then the reason ostensibly provided by affective trust in fact reduces to a more ordinary probabilistic reason. What justifies an audience’s acceptance of an affectively trusted speaker’s testimony is therefore the audience’s background assessment of risk that made the trust and so acceptance reasonable in the first place. What is epistemically important is the fact that we discriminate in trust and have empirical reasons to support this.

This objection misses the extent to which affective trust is a basic and non-reducible attitude. To affectively trust is not simply to adopt a strategy for attempting to ensure the achievement of a certain end. So it is wrong to suppose that the reformer trusts because she can reason that the ex-convict is the kind of person that will be trust-responsive. Such reasoning is inimical to trust; if the reformer reasons this way, it is only because she trusts her new employee. Trust comes first.  

It may be conceded that we always have empirical reasons for accepting what a trusted speaker says, and it might be allowed that this is true even in the

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26 Thus and for instance Hardin claims that what makes trust reasonable is the belief that the trusted is trustworthy, where this belief is then supported by the belief that the trusted have ‘the desire for the relationship to continue—for whatever reason, from merely financial interests, to deeper emotional ties, to reputational effects other relationships’ (Hardin 2006, p. 31).

27 ‘Trusting someone does not involve relying on them and having some belief about them: a belief, perhaps, that they are trustworthy. What it involves is relying on them to do something, and investing that reliance with a certain attitude.’ (Holton 1994, p. 67)
However, if this is conceded, the issue becomes the epistemic role these reasons play in acceptance, and the point is that they are not a pre-condition of affective trust and so are not necessary for acceptance to be reasonable. This is not to suggest either that we do not or somehow should not discriminate in trust; rather the claim is that when acceptance is based on trust, it is based on certain presumptions about the trusted and about the relationship had with them. Whilst we can have good evidence for the truth of these presumptions—we can believe them to hold and with good reason—if the reformer is willing to depend only given this belief and good reason, as the objection suggests, then she does not really trust. Too thorough an assessment of the risk is inimical to trust. This point is subtle because it is not clear at what point trust ceases, but there is a point at which one merely believes what is said and not the person. Equally subtle is the point at which the evidence undermines trust. The objection is right to claim that affective trust can be unjustified and right to assign a central justificatory role to the proposition that the trusted will prove trust-responsive. However, it is not the truster’s evidence for this proposition that justifies affective trust, and to claim so much is to fail to acknowledge any difference between the justification of affective trust, and that of predictive trust. Rather, a condition on affective trust being reasonable is that it is not unreasonable to presume that the trusted will prove trust-responsive. This would not be reasonable if the evidence obliges one to believe otherwise, but trust would ordinarily be unreasonable before this point.

To conclude this section on a less defensive note, empirical evidence for a testimony’s truth is not merely unnecessary for reasonable acceptance, arguably it only suffices for justified acceptance given a problematic assumption. The problem is that our empirical reasons are inductive and not all inductions are good ones. The inference from a sample of sea salt being soluble in water to the general claim that salt is soluble in water is a good inductive inference; otherwise put: ‘being soluble in water’ is projectible with respect to ‘being salt’. However, what about the inference from a speaker telling the truth on an occasion or a number of occasions to the speaker telling the truth more generally? Or more generally on occasions like these? This inference is good provided there is something constant across these cases that explains the speaker telling the truth. With respect to the solubility of salt, this constant is the microstructures of salt (NaCl) and water (H₂O). With respect to the truth of utterance, this constant is the truth of an intentional descrip-

\(^{28}\) Indeed, I think that this is the case. See Faulkner 2002.
tion; throughout the speaker intended (or not) to be informative.\textsuperscript{29} Thus, empirical reasons are justificatory only given the truth of an assumption about speaker intentions.\textsuperscript{30} However, if this is the case it is perverse to base acceptance on these reasons rather than on trust. It is perverse because whilst an audience’s attitude of affective trust explains why acceptance is reliable (given the truth of certain presumptions about the speaker’s intentions), the audience’s empirical reasons do no more than individuate a reliable process (given the truth of certain presumptions about speaker intentions).

5. Assurance and evidential theories of testimony

This account of affective trust directly addresses the debate between assurance and evidential theories of testimony. According to evidential theories of testimony, it is evidence that justifies an audience’s accepting testimony to \( p \) and so acquiring the testimonial belief that \( p \). For reductive theories, acceptance is justified when an audience possesses empirical evidence that \( p \) is true; whilst for anti-reductive evidential theories, a priori evidence establishes that acceptance is justified provided an audience lacks empirical evidence that \( p \) is false. The problem with these accounts according to assurance views is that testimony can consist of a speaker’s \textit{telling} an audience that \( p \). And in telling an audience that \( p \), a speaker will not intend the audience’s reason for belief to be independent facts about the evidential value of his telling but simply that he tells the audience that \( p \). This is the main insight of assurance views: a telling provides an audience with a reason for belief because of facts about its intentional production. Moran proposes a modification of Grice’s account of telling: in telling an audience that \( p \), a speaker intends that the audience conceives his intention that the audience come to believe that \( p \) as an assumption of responsibility for the audience’s so doing. In telling an audience that \( p \), a speaker in this way intends that the audience treat his telling as offering his assurance or promise that \( p \). Thus evidential theories, Moran claims, radically mischaracterize our reasons for accepting tellings. I think that this is correct, but that any epistemology of testimony \textit{qua} tellings must address the fact that speakers can present a telling as assurance when it

\textsuperscript{29}Take Lackey’s ‘consistent liar’ case, observations of the truths uttered by this liar provide good reason to accept what the liar says provided we presume that the liar’s intentions remain constant, i.e. that the liar continues to lie. See Lackey 2006.

\textsuperscript{30}Such a presumption of speaker uniformity is explicitly made by Hume, and not seen as problematic. See Faulkner 1998.
is a lie. In telling an audience that \( p \) and lying, a speaker will equally intend that the audience treat his telling as offering his assurance or promise that \( p \). So, the fact that an audience recognises this pattern of intentions does not itself suffice to give the audience a reason to believe that \( p \), what is further required for the audience to take these intentions at face value is trust. The problem is that at this juncture evidential theories assert the following dilemma. An audience can have that reason for belief described by assurance views only if the audience trusts the speaker. The dilemma is then that evidential theories exhaust the available accounts for an audience being justified in believing that a speaker is trustworthy.

Discriminating between affective and predictive notions of trust shows this dilemma to be a false one. Starting with the problem posed by lies, it is true that an audience needs a reason to take a speaker’s telling that \( p \) as a reason for believing that \( p \). And it is true that this reason is provided by the audience’s attitude of trust. But trust need not consist in the belief that the speaker is trustworthy. To equate trust with this belief is to view trust as predictive and to reassert the evidential view that an audience’s reasons for belief are ultimately evidence based. However, in telling an audience that \( p \) a speaker invites the audience’s trust in an affective sense. In offering his telling as an assurance or promise a speaker invites an audience to view it as an intentional response to the audience’s need for information. In telling an audience that \( p \), a speaker invites the audience to presume that his telling is motivated by the audience’s need for information as to whether \( p \). Tellings invite trust in the thicker affective sense and it is an audience’s attitude of affective trust, rather than any belief in trustworthiness, that provides the audience with a reason for accepting a speaker’s telling. This preserves the main insight of assurance views because whether the reason provided by trust is justifying depends on whether the presumptions that an audience makes in trust are fulfilled. Thus a speaker’s telling an audience that \( p \) provides the audience with a justifying reason for belief only if the speaker’s intentions are non-deceptive as the audience’s trust presumes them to be.

The claim that it is an audience’s attitude of affective trust that supplies the audience with a reason for accepting what a speaker tells them also identifies a middle way between reductive and anti-reductive theories of testimony. This claim supports a central tenet of anti-reductive theories: we can be justified in accepting testimony without supporting empirical evidence. However, this is not because we have an a priori grounded entitlement to do so but because affective trust is an attitude
whose adoption need not be evidence-based. The idea that we have
some universal presumptive epistemic right gets the psychology and
epistemology of trust wrong. Psychologically speaking, we are not dis-
posed to trust everyone, or to trust everyone unless faced with
counterevidence: we only trust certain persons. (In the modern world,
‘certain persons’ might extend broadly, but this is a peculiar feature of
the modern world.)31) Epistemologically speaking, it is facts about the
relationship had with the trusted that determines the justification of
trust, it is not the mere absence of defeating reasons. If it were the latter,
then unreasonable credulity could be justified on the basis of an insen-
sitivity to the evidence. However, given the mendacity of testimony,
acceptance needs rational support if it is to be reasonable. Thus a cen-
tral tenet of reductive theories is correct: we do need a positive reason
to believe what speakers tell us given that speakers lie, and our reasons
are themselves epistemically evaluable—we can have good and bad rea-
sons for accepting what speakers tell us. However, our positive reason
for accepting a speaker’s telling is not supplied by our beliefs about the
speaker’s trustworthiness or other empirical evidence, rather it is sup-
plied by our attitude of affective trust. But like the belief that a speaker
is trustworthy, the attitude of affectively trusting a speaker to be trust-
worthy is epistemically evaluable and can be justified, or not.32

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