Eric Olson
BA Reed, PhD Syracuse
Department of Philosophy
Professor in Philosophy
+44 114 222 0591
Full contact details
Department of Philosophy
Room C14
45 Victoria Street
Sheffield
S3 7QB
- Profile
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Eric grew up in the deserts of eastern Washington state, surrounded by tumbleweed, coyotes, and rattlesnakes. Like many philosophers, he spent his childhood wanting to become a scientist but had a conversion experience as an undergraduate. His expensive education was followed by a period of unemployment and hunger. Eventually, his luck changed and in 1995 he obtained a lectureship at Cambridge. He moved to Sheffield in 2003.
Eric's research is primarily in metaphysics and related areas. Topics of particular interest include personal identity, material objects, time, and death. He is perhaps best known for his book The Human Animal, which argues for the unorthodox view that we are biological organisms ('animalism').
- Publications
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Books
- Que sommes-nous ?: Sur la nature métaphysique des personnes.
Journal articles
- parfits metaphysics and what matters in survival. Argumenta, 5(1), 21-39.
- Narrative and persistence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49(3), 414-434. View this article in WRRO
- The Zombies Among Us. Nous, 52(1), 216-226. View this article in WRRO
- Swinburne’s brain transplants. Philosophia Christi, 20(1), 21-29. View this article in WRRO
- Ben’s body reads the Guardian. Chinese Semiotic Studies, 13(4), 367-380. View this article in WRRO
- Tajemnicza Operacja. Filozofuj!, 1(13), 9-11.
- Interview by Simon Cushing. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics.
- What does it mean to say that we are animals?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22(11-12), 84-107. View this article in WRRO
- Review of P. Snowdon, Persons, Animals, Ourselves. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
- The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 52, 24-40.
- The Epicurean View of Death. Journal of Ethics, 1-14.
- The extended self. Minds and Machines, 21(4), 481-495.
- The Extended Self. Minds and Machines, 1-15.
- Ethics and the generous ontology.. Theor Med Bioeth, 31(4), 259-270.
- Self: Personal Identity, 301-312.
- The rate of time's passage. ANALYSIS, 69(1), 3-9.
- What are we?. J CONSCIOUSNESS STUD, 14(5-6), 37-55.
- Temporal parts and timeless parthood. NOUS, 40(4), 738-752.
- Identity, personal identity, and the self. EUR J PHILOS, 14(3), 434-437.
- Consciousness and persons: Unity and identity.. PHILOS PHENOMEN RES, 73(2), 500-503.
- The paradox of increase. MONIST, 89(3), 390-417. View this article in WRRO
- Imperfect identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 106(1), 249-266.
- Animalism and the corpse problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(2), 265-274. View this article in WRRO
- The Ontological Basis of Strong Artificial Lif.. Artif. Life, 3, 29-39. View this article in WRRO
- Against Person Essentialism. Mind. View this article in WRRO
Chapters
- Properties as parts of ordinary objects In Keller JA (Ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen (pp. 62-79). Oxford University Press View this article in WRRO
- The remnant-person problem In Blatti S (Ed.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity (pp. 145-161). Oxford University Press View this article in WRRO
- The role of the brainstem in personal identity In Blank A (Ed.), Animals: New Essays Philosophia Verlag View this article in WRRO
- On Parfit's view that we are not human beings In Anthony O'Hear (Ed.), Mind, self and person Cambridge University Press View this article in WRRO
- Life after death and the devastation of the grave In Martin M & Augustine K (Ed.), The myth of an afterlife: The Case against Life After Death Rowman & Littlefield View this article in WRRO
Website content
- Why is death bad?.
- Que sommes-nous ?: Sur la nature métaphysique des personnes.