BA Reed, PhD Syracuse
Department of Philosophy
Professor in Philosophy
+44 114 222 0591
Full contact details
Department of Philosophy
45 Victoria Street
Eric grew up in the deserts of eastern Washington state, surrounded by tumbleweed, coyotes, and rattlesnakes. Like many philosophers, he spent his childhood wanting to become a scientist but had a conversion experience as an undergraduate. His expensive education was followed by a period of unemployment and hunger. Eventually, his luck changed and in 1995 he obtained a lectureship at Cambridge. He moved to Sheffield in 2003.
Eric's research is primarily in metaphysics and related areas. Topics of particular interest include personal identity, material objects, time, and death. He is perhaps best known for his book The Human Animal, which argues for the unorthodox view that we are biological organisms ('animalism').
- parfits metaphysics and what matters in survival. Argumenta, 5(1), 21-39.
- Narrative and persistence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49(3), 414-434. View this article in WRRO
- The Zombies Among Us. Nous, 52(1), 216-226. View this article in WRRO
- Swinburne’s brain transplants. Philosophia Christi, 20(1), 21-29. View this article in WRRO
- Ben’s body reads the Guardian. Chinese Semiotic Studies, 13(4), 367-380. View this article in WRRO
- Tajemnicza Operacja. Filozofuj!, 1(13), 9-11.
- Interview by Simon Cushing. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics.
- View this article in WRRO What does it mean to say that we are animals?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22(11-12), 84-107.
- Review of P. Snowdon, Persons, Animals, Ourselves. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
- The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 52, 24-40.
- The Epicurean View of Death. Journal of Ethics, 1-14.
- The extended self. Minds and Machines, 21(4), 481-495.
- The Extended Self. Minds and Machines, 1-15.
- Ethics and the generous ontology.. Theor Med Bioeth, 31(4), 259-270.
- Self: Personal Identity, 301-312.
- The rate of time's passage. ANALYSIS, 69(1), 3-9.
- What are we?. J CONSCIOUSNESS STUD, 14(5-6), 37-55.
- Temporal parts and timeless parthood. NOUS, 40(4), 738-752.
- Identity, personal identity, and the self. EUR J PHILOS, 14(3), 434-437.
- Consciousness and persons: Unity and identity.. PHILOS PHENOMEN RES, 73(2), 500-503.
- View this article in WRRO The paradox of increase. MONIST, 89(3), 390-417.
- Imperfect identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 106(1), 249-266.
- Animalism and the corpse problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(2), 265-274. View this article in WRRO
- View this article in WRRO The Ontological Basis of Strong Artificial Lif.. Artif. Life, 3, 29-39.
- View this article in WRRO Against Person Essentialism. Mind.
- Properties as parts of ordinary objects In Keller JA (Ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen (pp. 62-79). Oxford University Press View this article in WRRO
- The remnant-person problem In Blatti S (Ed.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity (pp. 145-161). Oxford University Press View this article in WRRO
- View this article in WRRO The role of the brainstem in personal identity In Blank A (Ed.), Animals: New Essays Philosophia Verlag
- View this article in WRRO On Parfit's view that we are not human beings In Anthony O'Hear (Ed.), Mind, self and person Cambridge University Press
- View this article in WRRO Life after death and the devastation of the grave In Martin M & Augustine K (Ed.), The myth of an afterlife: The Case against Life After Death Rowman & Littlefield