Eric Olson's Publications


Original Articles

Reviews, Interviews, Reference Articles, and Other Bits

In Press


The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology

New York: Oxford University Press 1997; published electronically by Oxford Scholarship Online 2003.

Named 'an outstanding academic book of 1997' by Choice.

Italian translation, L'animale umano: Identità e continuità biologica, McGraw Hill 1999.

APA Author-Meets-Critics Session in Abstracta

Preview on Google Books

What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology

New York: Oxford University Press 2007; published electronically by Oxford Scholarship Online 2008.

French translation, Que somme-nous? Sur la nature metaphysique des personnes, Ithaque 2017

Preview on Google Books

original articles

Is Psychology Relevant to Personal Identity?
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, 1994: 173-86.

Human People or Human Animals?
Philosophical Studies 80, 1995: 159-81.

Why I Have no Hands
Theoria 61, 1995: 182-197.

Composition and Coincidence
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77, 1996: 374-403.

Dion's Foot
Journal of Philosophy 94, 1997: 260-65.

Was I Ever a Fetus?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 1997: 95-110.

Reprinted in revised form in R. Nichols et al., eds., Philosophy Through Science Fiction, Routledge 2008 (link below).

Relativism and Persistence
Philosophical Studies 88, 1997: 141-62.

The Ontological Basis of Strong Artificial Life
Artificial Life 3, 1997: 29-39  doi:10.1162/artl.1997.3.1.29  [Please contact me if you have a copy of this!]

Human Atoms
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76, 1998: 396-406.

There is no Problem of the Self
Journal of Consciousness Studies 5, 1998: 645-57, and in S. Gallagher and J. Shearer, eds., Models of the Self, Imprint Academic 1999.

Reprinted in B. Gertler and L. Shapiro, eds., Arguing About the Mind, Routledge 2007.

Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, 1999: 161-66.

A Compound of Two Substances
In K. Corcoran, ed., Soul, Body, and Survival. Cornell University Press, 2001: 73-88.

Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem
Philosophical Quarterly 51, 2001: 337-55.

Personal Identity and the Radiation Argument
Analysis 61, 2001: 38-43.

Thinking Animals and the Constitution View
Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind, 2001.

What does Functionalism Tell Us about Personal Identity?
Noûs 36, 2002: 682-98.

Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I'
Philosophical Topics 30, 2002: 189-208.

An Argument for Animalism
In R. Martin and J. Barresi, eds., Personal Identity, Blackwell 2003: 318-34.  

Reprinted in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions 2e, Blackwell 2008; in M. Rea, ed., Arguing About Metaphysics, Routledge 2009; in J. Lizza, ed., Defining the Beginning and End of Life, Johns Hopkins University Press 2009; in J. Kim et al., eds., Metaphysics: An Anthology 2e, Blackwell 2011; and in S. Hetherington, ed., Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Guided Anthology, Blackwell 2013.

Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism
Philosophical Quarterly 53, 2003: 92-95.

Was Jekyll Hyde?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66, 2003: 328-348.

Warum Wir Tiere Sind
In K. Petrus, ed., On Human Persons, Ontos Verlag 2003: 11-22.

Animalism and the Corpse Problem
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, 2004: 265-74.

Imperfect Identity
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104, 2006: 81-98.

Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity?
In F. MacBride, ed., Identity and Modality, Oxford University Press 2006: 242-259.

Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood
Noûs 40, 2006: 738-752.

The Paradox of Increase
The Monist 89, 2006: 390-417.

Reprinted in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 2e, Blackwell 2008.

What Are We?
Journal of Consciousness Studies 14: 5-6 (special issue: Dimensions of Personhood), 2007: 37-55, and in A. Laitinen and H. Ikäheimo, eds., Dimensions of Personhood, Imprint Academic 2007.

Was I Ever a Fetus? (new version)
In R. Nichols et al., eds., Philosophy Through Science Fiction, Routledge 2008.

The Rate of Time's Passage
Analysis 69, 2009: 3-9.

The Passage of Time
In R. Le Poidevin et al., eds., The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics 2009: 440-48.

Ethics and the Generous Ontology
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (special issue: Personal Identity and Bioethics), 2010: 259–270.

Immanent Causation and Life After Death
In G. Gasser, ed., Personal Identity and Resurrection, Routledge 2010: 51-66.

The Extended Self
Minds and Machines 21 (special issue: The Construction of Personal Identities Online), 2011: 481-495.

Identity, Quantification, and Number  
In T. Tahko, ed., Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press 2012: 66-82.

In Search of the Simple View
In G. Gasser and M. Stefan, eds., Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?  Cambridge University Press 2012: 44-62.

The Person and the Corpse
In B. Bradley, et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, OUP 2013: 80-96.

The Epicurean View of Death
Journal of Ethics 17 (special issue: The Benefits and Harms of Existence and Non-Existence), 2013: 65-78.

The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning
Southern Journal of Philosophy 52, Spindel Supplement, 2014: 24-40.

Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem
In J. Fonseca and J. Gonçalves, eds., Philosophical Perspectives on the Self, Peter Lang 2015: 21-40.

Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave
In M. Martin and K. Augustine, eds., The Myth of an Afterlife, Rowman & Littlefield, 2015: 409-423.

On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings
In A. O'Hear, ed., Mind, Self and Person (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76), CUP 2015: 39-56.

Italian translation to appear in a special issue of Rivista di Indagine Filosofica e di Nuove Pratiche della Conoscenza.

What Does It Mean to Say That We Are Animals?
Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12 special issue: The First-Person Perspective and the Self), 2015: 84-107.

The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity
In A. Blank, ed., Animals: New Essays, Philosophia 2016: 291-302.

The Remnant-Person Problem
In S. Blatti and P. Snowdon, eds., Animalism, OUP 2016: 145-161.

Properties as Parts of Ordinary Objects
In J. Keller, ed., Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from van Inwagen, OUP 2017: 62-79.

The Central Dogma of Transhumanism
In B. Bercic, ed., Perspectives on the Self, University of Rijeka  2017: 35-58.

Ben's Body Reads the Guardian
Chinese Semiotic Studies 13 (4), 2017: 367-380.

Radical Resurrection and Divine Commands
In S. Cushing, ed., Heaven and Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield 2018: 29-44.

The Zombies Among Us
Noûs 52, 2018: 216–226.

Swinburne's Brain Transplants
Philosophia Christi 20, 2018: 21-29.

The Metaphysics of Artificial Intelligence
In M. Guta, ed., Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties, Routledge 2019: 67-84.

Narrative and Persistence (with Karsten Witt)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49, 2019: 419–434.

reviews, reference articles, etc.

Review of J. Dancy, ed., Reading Parfit
Philosophical Books 39, 1998: 252-254.

Review of E. J. Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics
Mind 109, 2000: 967-69.

Review of J. Wilson, Biological Individuality
Philosophical Quarterly 51, 2001.

Review of L. R. Baker, Persons and Bodies
Mind 110, 2001: 427-30.

Mind-Body Problem
In C. Blakemore & S. Jennett, eds., The Oxford Companion to the Body, OUP 2001: 469-70.

'Reprinted' in

Personal Identity
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2002 (revised 2007, 2008, 2010, 2015).

Reprinted in S. Schneider, ed., Science Fiction and Philosophy, Blackwell 2009, 2e Wiley 2016.

Review of H. Hudson, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2002.

The Ontology of Material Objects: Critical Notice of T. Merricks, Objects and Persons
Philosophical Books 43, 2002: 292-99.

Personal Identity
In S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell 2003: 352-68.

Review of J. Perry, Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self
European Journal of Philosophy 14, 2006: 434-7.

Review of M. Tye, Consciousness and Persons
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73, 2006: 500-503

Précis of The Human Animal and Replies to Critics
Abstracta Special Issue I, 2008: 5-7, 32-42.

Review of P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman, eds., Persons: Human and Divine
Mind 117, 2008: 234-7.

Pourquoi Nous Sommes des Animaux
Revue Terrain 52, 2009: 78-95.

Self: Personal Identity
In W. Banks, ed., Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier Academic Press 2009.

In A. Steglich-Petersen, ed., Metaphysics: 5 Questions, Automatic Press 2010: 75-84.

Personal Identity
Oxford Bibliographies Online 2011, updated 2017.

Interview with 3:AM Magazine, May 2012.

The Nature of People
In S. Luper, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death, CUP 2014: 30-46.

Review of P. Snowdon, Persons, Animals, Ourselves
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2015.

Why is Death Bad?
Aeon, 2016.

Interview by Simon Cushing
Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics (Philosophical Profiles), 2016.  Click here for video.

PhilonoUS 1 (2), 2016: 76-81.

Tajemnicza Operacja ('A Curious Operation', in Polish)
Filozofuj!, 2017 no 1 (13): 9-11.  English original

Zycie po Smierci (‘Life After Death’)
Filozofuj!, 2017 no 3 (15): 21-23.

Interview by Jonathan Loose (video), 2017

For Animalism
In J. Loose, et al., eds., The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, Blackwell 2018: 297-306.

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018.

Date Palm Compote, 2019.  Russian translation here.

Animalismus als Theorie der Menschlichen Person
In Jörg Noller, ed., Was Sind und Wie Existieren Personen?, Mentis 2019: 99-107.

Interview at the Center for Consciousness Studies, Moscow State University (video), 2019

Apollo 11 made us believe we could do anything – the truth is it could hasten our downfall
The Conversation, 18.7.19.

Reprinted, under an absurdly misleading headline, in The Sun.

in press

Objects and Their Matter
To appear in R. Garcia, ed., Substance, Philosophia Verlag.

The Metaphysics of Transhumanism
To appear in K. Hübner, ed., Human: A History, OUP.

Death and Immortality
To appear in N. Ozanic, ed., University of Rijeka Scientific Colloquium 2016/2017, University of Rijeka.

Parfit's Metaphysics and What Matters in Survival
To appear in a special issue of Argumenta.

What is the Problem of Biological Individuality?
To appear in J. Dupré and A. S. Meincke, eds., Biological Identity: Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Biology, Routledge.

Contact me if you would like a copy of something listed here but not downloadable.