Professor Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Department of Economics
Professor of Economics
+44 114 222 3319
Full contact details
Department of Economics
9 Mappin Street
Subhasish M. Chowdhury joined Sheffield as Professor of Economics in 2022. His areas of research interest cover both theoretical and applied investigations of problems in Conflict, Industrial Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Political Economy. Subhasish serves as a Co-Editor of the journals ‘Frontiers in Behavioral Economics’, and ‘Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy’ and is an editorial board member of ‘Studies in Microeconomics’. He has also served as a guest-editor for ‘Economic Inquiry’ and the ‘Journal of Economics Psychology’. His research has been published in journals such as the Economic Journal, European Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Public Economics, Economic Theory etc.
- ‘Born this way’? Prenatal exposure to testosterone may determine behavior in competition and conflict. Journal of Economic Psychology.
- Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests. Southern Economic Journal, 89(3), 924-974.
- And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests. Review of Economic Design.
- Group size and matching protocol in contests. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 54(4), 1716-1736.
- Gender differences in repeated dishonest behavior: Experimental evidence. Games, 12(2).
- Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-Battle Contests. The Economic Journal, 131(636), 1593-1619.
- Pre‐planning and its effects on repeated dishonest behavior: An experiment. Bulletin of Economic Research, 73(2), 143-153.
- Conflict in the Time of (Post-) Corona: Some Assessments from Behavioral Economics. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 26(3).
- Post-cartel tacit collusion: Determinants, consequences, and prevention. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 70, 102590-102590.
- Gender differences in giving and the anticipation regarding giving in dictator games. Oxford Economic Papers, 72(3), 772-779.
- That’s the ticket: explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests. Theory and Decision, 88(3), 405-429.
- An experimental investigation of the ‘tenuous trade-off’ between risk and incentives in organizations. Theory and Decision, 88(1), 153-190.
- The effects of conflict budget on the intensity of conflict: an experimental investigation. Experimental Economics, 23(1), 240-258.
- The attack and defense mechanisms: Perspectives from behavioral economics and game theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42.
- Auction Versus Posted Price Mechanisms in Online Sales: The Roles of Impatience and Dissuasion. Studies in Microeconomics, 7(1), 75-88.
- PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LOSS AVERSION IN CONTESTS. Economic Inquiry, 56(3), 1492-1511.
- The All-Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff. Southern Economic Journal, 84(2), 375-390.
- “Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 486-493.
- Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game. Southern Economic Journal, 84(2), 474-483.
- Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules. Economics Letters, 155, 126-130.
- The hidden perils of affirmative action: Sabotage in handicap contests. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 133, 273-284.
- Exclusivity and exclusion on platform Markets. Journal of Economics, 120(2), 95-118.
- OVERBIDDING AND HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR IN CONTEST EXPERIMENTS: A COMMENT ON THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT. Journal of Economic Surveys, 31(2), 572-576.
- Identity and group conflict. European Economic Review, 90, 107-121.
- Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction. Social Choice and Welfare, 47(4), 959-971.
- Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 118(4), 816-840.
- The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-Pay Auction. Southern Economic Journal, 83(1), 105-125.
- THE ATTACK‐AND‐DEFENSE GROUP CONTESTS: BEST SHOT VERSUS WEAKEST LINK. Economic Inquiry, 54(1), 548-557.
- Sabotage in contests: a survey. Public Choice, 164(1-2), 135-155.
- Strategically equivalent contests. Theory and Decision, 78(4), 587-601.
- A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms. Economics Letters, 125(3), 357-359.
- Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules. Games and Economic Behavior, 87, 224-238.
- Impure altruism or inequality aversion?: An experimental investigation based on income effects. Journal of Public Economics, 118, 143-150.
- Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 92, 94-103.
- An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games. Economic Theory, 52(3), 833-861.
- Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests. Economics Letters, 112(2), 216-219.
- A generalized Tullock contest. Public Choice, 147(3-4), 413-420.
- Indian Telecom: Regulation, Spectrum Allocation and Dispute Management. IIMB Management Review, 21(4), 287-287.
- Antitrust and the "Beckerian Proposition": The effects of investigation and fines on cartels In Tremblay VJ, Schroeder E & Horton Tremblay C (Ed.), Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization (pp. 368-403).
- The Economics of Identity and Conflict. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance Oxford University Press.
- 4th Walter Isard Annual Award for the Best Article in Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 27(1), 1-2.
- Applications of sports data to study decision making. Journal of Economic Psychology, 75, 102153-102153.
- INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM-CONTESTS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE. Economic Inquiry, 56(3), 1445-1446.